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Improving Search Algorithms by Using Intelligent Coordinates
David Wolpert, Kagan Tumer, and Esfandiar Bandari
NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA, 94035, USA
We consider the problem of designing a set of computational agents so that as they all pursue
their self-interests a global function G of the collective system is optimized. Three factors govern the
quality of such design. The first relates to conventional exploration-exploitation search algorithms
for finding the maxima of such a global function, e.g., simulated annealing (SA). Game-theoretic
algorithms instead are related to the second of those factors, and the third is related to techniques
from the field of machine learning. Here we demonstrate how to exploit all three factors by modifying
the search algorithm’s exploration stage so that rather than by random sampling, each coordinate of
the underlying search space is controlled by an associated machine-learning-based “player” engaged
in a non-cooperative game. Experiments demonstrate that this modification improves SA by up to
an order of magnitude for bin-packing and for a model of an economic process run over an underlying
network. These experiments also reveal novel small worlds phenomena.
PACS numbers: 89.20.Ff,89.75.-k ,89.75.Fb,02.60.Pn, 02.70.-c, 02.70.Tt
I. INTRODUCTION
Many distributed systems found in nature have in-
spired function-maximization algorithms. In some of
these the coordinates of the underlying system are viewed
as players engaged in a non-cooperative game, whose
joint behavior (hopefully) maximizes the pre-specified
global function of the entire system. Examples of such
systems are auctions and clearing of markets. Typically
in the computer-based algorithms inspired by such “col-
lectives” of players, each separate coordinate of the sys-
tem is controlled by an associated machine learning al-
gorithm [3, 4, 7, 10, 16, 23], reinforcement-learning (RL)
algorithms being particularly common [17, 22].
One important issue concerning such collectives is
whether the payoff function gη of each player η is suf-
ficiently sensitive to what coordinates η controls in com-
parison to the other coordinates, so that η can learn how
to control its coordinates to achieve high payoff. A second
crucial issue is the need for all of the gη to be “aligned”
with G, so that as the players individually learn how to
increase their payoffs, G also increases.
Previous work in the COllective INtelligence (COIN)
framework addresses these issues. This work extends
conventional game-theoretic mechanism design [8, 15] to
include off-equilibrium behavior, learnability issues, gη
with non-human attributes (e.g., gη for which incentive
compatibility is irrelevant), and arbitrary G. In domains
from network routing to congestion problems it outper-
form traditional techniques, by up to several orders of
magnitude for large systems [18, 21, 22].
Other collective systems found in nature that have
inspired search algorithms do not involve players con-
ducting a non-cooperative game. Examples include spin
glasses, genomes undergoing neo-Darwinian natural se-
lection, and eusocial insect colonies, which have been
translated into simulated annealing (SA [9, 11]), ge-
netic algorithms [1, 5], and swarm intelligence [2, 12],
respectively. An important issue here is the explo-
ration/exploitation dynamics of the overall collective.
Recent analysis reveals how G is governed by the inter-
action between exploration/exploitation, the alignment
of the gη and G, and the learnability of the gη [21]. Here
we use that analysis to motivate a hybrid algorithm, In-
telligent Coordinates for search (IC), that addresses all
three issues. It works by modifying any exploration-
based search algorithm so that each coordinate being
searched is made “intelligent”, its exploration value being
the move of a game-playing computer algorithm rather
than the random sample of a probability distribution.
Like SA, IC is intended to be used as an “off the shelf”
algorithm; rarely will it be the best possible algorithm
for some particular domain. Rather it is designed for use
in very large problems where parallelization can provide
a large advantage, while there is little exploitable infor-
mation concerning gradients. We present experiments
comparing IC and SA on two archetypal domains: bin-
packing and an economic model of people choosing for-
mats for their home music systems.
In the bin-packing domain IC achieves a given value of
G up to three orders of magnitude faster than does SA,
with the improvement increasing linearly with the size of
the problem. In the format choice problem G is the sum
of each person’s “happiness” with her format choices.
Each person η’s happiness with each of her choices is
set by three factors: which of her nearest neighbors on
a ring network (η’s “friends”) make that choice; η’s in-
trinsic preference for that choice; and the price of music
purchased in that format, inversely proportional to the
total number of players using that choice. Here again, IC
improves G two orders of magnitude more quickly than
does SA. We also considered an algorithm similar to the
Groves mechanism of economics; IC outperformed it by
over two orders of magnitude. We also modified the ring
to be a small-worlds network [13, 14, 19]. This barely
improved IC’s performance (3%), with no effect on the
other algorithms. However if G was also changed, so that
each η’s happiness depends on agreeing with her friends’
friends, the performance increase in changing to a small-
worlds topology is significant (10%). This underscores
2the multiplicity of factors behind the benefits of small-
worlds networks.
II. SIMPLIFIED THEORY OF COLLECTIVES
Let z ∈ ζ be the joint move of all agents/players in the
collective. We want the z that maximizes the provided
world utility G(z). In addition to G we have private
utility functions {gη}, one for each agent η controlling
zη. ˆη refers to all agents other than η.
Intelligence “standardizes” utility functions so that
the value they assign to z only reflects their ranking of z
relative to some other z′. One form of it is
Nη,U (z) ≡
∫
dµzˆη (z
′)Θ[U(z)− U(z′)] , (1)
where Θ is the Heaviside function, and where the sub-
script on the (normalized) measure dµ indicates it is re-
stricted to z′ such that z′ˆη = zˆ η.
Our uncertainty concerning the system induces a dis-
tribution P (z). All attributes of the collective we can
set, e.g., the private utility functions of the agents, are
given by the value of the design coordinate s. Bayes
theorem provides the central equation:
P (G | s) = (2)∫
d ~NGP (G | ~NG, s)
∫
d ~NgP ( ~NG | ~Ng, s)P ( ~Ng | s) ,
where ~NG and ~Ng are the intelligence vectors for all the
agents, for utilities gη and for G, respectively. Nη,gη (z) =
1 means that agent η’s move maximizes its utility, given
the moves of the other agents. So ~Ng(z) = ~1 means z
is a Nash equilibrium. Conversely, ~NG(z
′) = ~1 means
that the value of G cannot increase in moving from z′
along any single (sic) coordinate of ζ. So if these two
points are identical, then if the agents do well enough at
maximizing their private utilities they must be near an
(on-axis) maximizing point for G.
More formally, say for our s the third conditional prob-
ability in the integrand in the central equation (“term
3”) is peaked near ~Ng = ~1. Then s probably induces
large (private utility function) intelligences (intuitively,
the utilities are learnable). If in addition the second term
is peaked near ~NG = ~Ng, then ~NG will also be large (in-
tuitively, the private utility is “aligned with G”). This
peakedness is assured if ~Ng = ~NG exactly ∀z. Such a sys-
tem is said to be factored. Finally, if the first term in
the integrand is peaked about high G when ~NG is large,
then s probably induces high G, as desired.
As a trivial example, a team game, where gη = G ∀η,
is factored [7]. However team games usually have poor
third terms, especially in large collectives. This is be-
cause each η has to discern how its moves affect gη = G,
given the background of the (varying) moves of the other
agents whose moves comparably affect G.
Fix some f(zη), two moves zη
1 and zη
2, a utility U , a
value s, and a zˆη. The associated learnability is
Λf (U ; zˆη, s, zη
1, zη
2) ≡ (3)√
[E(U ; zˆη, zη1)− E(U ; zˆη, zη2)]2∫
dzη[f(zη)V ar(U ; zˆη, zη)]
.
The averages and variance here are evaluated according
to P (U |nη)P (nη|zˆη, zη
1), P (U |nη)P (nη|zˆη, zη), and
P (U |nη)P (nη|zˆη, zη
2), respectively, where nη is η’s
training set, formed by sampling U .
The denominator in Eq. 3 reflects the sensitivity of
U(z) to zˆη, while the numerator reflects its sensitiv-
ity is to zη. So the greater the learnability of gη, the
more gη(z) depends only on the move of agent η, i.e.,
the more learnable gη is. More formally, it can be shown
that if appropriately scaled, g′η will result in better ex-
pected intelligence for agent η than will gη whenever
Λf(g
′
η; zˆη, s, zη
1, zη
2) > Λf (gη; zˆη, s, zη
1, zη
2) for all
pairs of moves zη
1, zη
2[20].
A difference utility is one of the form U(z) = G(z)−
D(zˆη). Any difference utility is factored [20]. In ad-
dition, under usually benign approximations, the D(zˆη)
that maximizes Λf (U ; zˆη, s, zη
1, zη
2) for all pairs zη
1, zη
2
is Ef (G(z) | zˆη, s), where the expectation value is over
zη. The associated difference utility is called the Aris-
tocrat utility (AU). If each η uses its AU as its private
utility, then we have both good terms 2 and 3.
Evaluating the expectation value in AU can be difficult
in practice. This motivates the Wonderful Life Utility
(WLU), which requires no such evaluation:
WLUη ≡ G(z)−G(zˆη, CLη) , (4)
where CLη is the clamping parameter. WLU is fac-
tored, independent of the clamping parameter. Further-
more, while not matching AU , WLU typically has far
better learnability than does a team game, and therefore
typically results in better values of G. It is also often
easier to evaluate than is G itself [18, 21].
One way to address term 1 as well as 2 and 3 is to
incorporate exploration/exploitation techniques like SA.
III. EXPERIMENTS
In our version of SA, at the beginning of each time-
step t a distribution hη(ζη) is formed for every η by al-
lotting probability 75% to the move η had at the end
of the preceding time-step, zη,t−1, and uniformly divid-
ing probability 25% across all of its other moves. The
“exploration” joint-move zexpl is then formed by simul-
taneously sampling all the hη. If G(zexpl) > G(zt−1), zη,t
is set to zexpl. Otherwise zt is set by sampling a Boltz-
mann distribution having energies G(zt−1) and G(zexpl).
Many different annealing schedules were investigated; all
results below are for best schedules found.
3IC is identical except that each hη is replaced by
hη(zη)cη,t(zη)∑
a′ hη(a
′
η)cη,t(a
′
η)
, where the distribution cη,t is set by an
RL algorithm trying to optimize payoffs gη. Here RL is
done using a training set nη,t of all preceding move-payoff
pairs, {(zη,t′ , gη(zt′) : t
′ < t)}. For each possible move by
η one forms the weighted average of the payoffs recorded
in nη,t that occurred with that move, where the weights
decay exponentially in t− t′. cη,t then is the Boltzmann
distribution, parameterized by a “learning temperature”
(that effectively rescales gη) over those averages.
In all our experiments the “AU” version of IC approx-
imated f to to be uniform ∀η, and then used a mean-
field approxmation to pull the expectation inside G. Un-
less otherwise specified, the clamping elements used in
WLU’s were set to ~0.
In bin-packing N items, all of size < c, must be as-
signed into a minimal subset of N bins, without assigning
a summed size > c to any one bin. G of an assignment
pattern is the number of occupied bins [6], and each agent
controls the bin choice of one item. To improve perfor-
mance all algorithms use a modified “G”, Gsoft, even
though their performance is measured with G:
Gsoft =
{ ∑N
i=1
[(
c
2
)2
−
(
xi −
c
2
)2]
if xi ≤ c∑N
i=1
(
xi −
c
2
)2
if xi > c
, (5)
where xi is the summed size of all items in bin i. (Use of
Gsoft encourages bins to be either full or empty.)
In the IC runs learning temperature was .2, and all
agents made the transition to RL-based moves after a
period of 100 random z’s used to generate the starting
nη. Exploitation temperature started at .5 for all algo-
rithms, and was multiplied by .8 every 100 exploitation
time-steps In each SA run, the distribution h was slowly
modified to generate solutions that differed in fewer items
than the current solution as time progressed.
Algorithm Ave. G Best Worst % Optimum
IC WLU 3.32 ± 0.22 2 8 72 %
IC TG 7.84 ± 0.17 6 10 0 %
COIN WLU 3.52 ± 0.20 2 7 64 %
COIN TG 7.84 ± 0.15 6 9 0 %
SA 6.00 ± 0.19 4 7 0 %
TABLE I: Bin-packing G at time 200 for N = 20, c = 12.
In Table 1 “Best” refers to the best end-of-run G
achieved by the associated algorithm, “worst” is the
worst value, and “%Optimum” is the percentage of runs
that were within one bin of the best value. Fig. 1 shows
average performances (over 25 runs) as a function of time
step. The algorithms that account for both terms 2
and 3 — IC WLU and COIN WLU — far outperform
the others, with the algorithm accounting for all three
terms doing best. The worst algorithms were those that
accounted for only a single term (SA and COIN TG).
Linearly (i.e., optimistically) extrapolating SA’s perfor-
mance from time 15000 indicates it would take over 1000
times as long as IC WLU to reach the G value IC WLU
reaches at time 200. In addition the ratio of WLU’s time
1000 performance (relative to random search) to SA’s
grows linearly with the size of the problem. Finally, Fig. 2
illustrates that the benefit of addressing terms 2 and 3
grows with the difficulty of the problem. In both figures
SA outperforms IC - TG; this is due to there being more
parameter-tuning with SA.
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FIG. 1: Average bin-packing G for N = 50, c = 10. All error
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FIG. 2: G vs. c for N = 20 at t = 200. All error bars ≤ .34.
For the format choice problem G is the sum over all
Na agents η of η’s “happiness” with its music formats:
G =
Na∑
η=1
Nf∑
i=1
∑
η′∈neighη
ϑ(i) ωη,η′,i prefη,i (6)
where Nf is the numbers of formats; neighη is the set
of players lying ≤ D hops away from player η; prefη,i
is η’s intrinsic preferenece for format i (set randomly at
initialization ∈ [0, 1]); ϑ(i) is the total number of players
that choose format i (i.e., the inverse price for format i);
and ωi,η,η′ = 1 if the choices of players η and η
′ both
include the format i, and 0 otherwise (each agent’s move
is a selection of three of four total formats, implemented
420000
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FIG. 3: G(t = 200) for 100 agents. In order from left to right,
D = {1, 1, 3, 3}, and topologies are {L,W,L,W}.
by choosing the one format not to be used). D values of
both 1 and 3 were investigated.
In Fig. 3, “IC Econ” refers to WLU IC where clamping
means the agent chooses no format whatsoever. It is es-
sentially the game-theory Groves mechanism wherein one
sets gη to η’s marginal contribution to G, here rescaled
and interleaved with a simulated annealing step to im-
prove performance. “IC-WLU” instead clamps η’s move
to zero (in accord with the theory of collectives), which
means that η chooses all formats. Learning temperature
was now .4, and exploitation temperature was .05 (an-
nealing provided no advantage since runs were short).
Two network topologies were investigated. Both were
m-node rings with an extra .06m random links added, a
new such set for each of the 50 runs giving a plotted av-
erage value. “Short links” (L) means that all extra links
connected players two hops apart, while “small-worlds”
(W) means there was no such restriction.
IC Econ’s inferior performance illustrates the short-
coming of economics-like algorithms. For D = 1 SA did
not benefit from small worlds connections, and IC vari-
ants barely benefited ( 3%), despite the associated drop
in average inter-node hop distance. However if D also
increased, so that G directly reflected the change in the
topology, then the gain with a small worlds topology grew
to 10%. (See the discussion on path lengths in [14].)
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